Issuers can use income-increasing, discretionary accruals to overstate earnings prior to initial public offerings (IPOs). Thus uninformed sentiment investors may end up paying too much for new issues on the first trading days. This paper provides evidence that issuers in China with unusually higher accruals in the IPO year tend to experience greater short-term underpricing and inferior long-term stock performance. This evidence is consistent with issuers window-dressing IPO firm earnings, investors naively extrapolating the growth trend, and with the overreaction of stock prices. This relation is statistically and economically significant and robust to a variety of benchmark model and variable specifications.
1.

Introduction
Several studies of initial public offerings (IPO) anomalies find that issues seem underpriced relative to first day trading prices and their long term stock returns appear to underperform a series of benchmarks during the subsequent three to five year period. Yet more studies of accrual anomalies examine the impact of earnings management on stock performance around earnings announcement and equity issues.
It is somewhat surprising that only a few studies rationalise IPO anomalies in the context of accrual anomalies, relating earnings management to underpricing and underperformance. This is all the more puzzling for the case of Chinese IPOs whose short term underpricing is huge even by international standards. This paper studies IPO anomalies for a sample of 506 Chinese IPOs during the period of 1998-2003 and proposes that earnings management can explain their huge initial returns and poor long term stock performance.
Earnings management can be related to the behaviour of naïve or sentiment investors. Barberis et al. (1998) develop a general model of investor sentiment in which investors extrapolate the growth trend in earnings. This naïve mistake propels stock prices to unduly high levels in the short run but this is gradually corrected over medium term horizons. Relatedly, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) attribute IPO underpricing to the existence of a class of investors who are, at times, irrationally exuberant about the prospects of IPOs. When exuberance fades in the long term, stocks underperform.
Our study links IPO and accrual anomalies 1 by investigating whether the discretionary components of accruals predict the cross-sectional variation in the underpricing and long term underperformance of IPOs.
The accrual variable in our study is that reported in the fiscal year in which firms go public which thus includes both pre-and post-IPO months. We do not use pre-IPO data to measure the extent of earnings management for two principal reasons.
On one hand, reliable and consistent information on pre-IPO data is not readily available for Chinese IPOs. On the other, the data gleaned from the first public financial statement are still representative as the incentives to manage earnings are likely to persist after the public offerings. Security regulations in China also induce issuers who engage in earnings management to maintain the earnings patterns. An immediate and unusual fall in company performance would soon attract the media spotlights and potentially trigger an official investigation by China's Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the stock market regulator.
Using industry peers as a benchmark, we separate accruals into usual and unusual components. We focus on the latter that are not explained by normal firm and business conditions and hence are called discretionary. We relate the accrual components to the underpricing of IPOs and find that IPO firms that are ranked in the highest quintile (aggressive IPOs) based on discretionary accruals earn a mean return on the first day of approximately 15 to 18 percentage points higher than that of firms ranked in the lowest quintile (conservative IPOs). Furthermore, cross-sectional evidence shows that these discretionary components are good predictors of market performance on the first day of trading. This result is robust to a variety of industry, model, and accrual specifications.
Our study contributes to the literature in three respects. First, our study complements the literature of accruals that examines earnings management around IPO such as Aharony et al. (1993) , Teoh et al. (1998b) , Teoh et al. (1998c ), Aharony et al. (2000 , Ducharme (2001), and Roomsenboom (2003) . In addition to the subsequent market performance of IPOs over long horizons which these studies focus on, our study examines the impact of accruals on the short-term IPO puzzle as well.
Second, our study adds to the literature that investigates the underpricing phenomenon of IPOs in China's stock markets, such as Mok and Hui (1998) , Su and Fleisher (1999) , Chan et al. (2004) , Chi and Padgett (2005) , and Su (2006) . Whilst these studies focus on institutional characteristics which are difficult to quantify, we earnings management and its impact can be readily estimated. Last but not the least, continued IPO anomalies have spawned a considerable number of prominent explanations. Among these, the investor sentiment approach of Barberis et al. (1998) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006) and underwriter reputation proposed by Carter et al.
(1998) are the only two that can potentially explain both short-and long-term IPO anomalies. Empirical studies therefore are separated into short-term or long-term investigations with the exception of Carter et al. (1998) . Our study makes a contribution by providing robust cross-sectional evidence that covers both horizons.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypothesis and empirical models examined in this study. Section 3 presents empirical results. Section 4 provides several robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes.
Hypothesis and Empirical Models
Hypothesis Development
Many indirect adjustments to cash flows are required in the traditional accrual accounting of reported earnings. These adjustments are designed to make earnings more informative about the financial situation of the firm for investors, and are collectively called accruals. The considerable incentives and much discretion over the size and timing of accruals are the cornerstone of our story for Chinese IPOs.
"It pays to do it. It is easy to do it, and it is unlikely that you get caught!"
There are always incentives for managers to manage reported earnings. But around the time of IPOs, the incentive to raise as much capital from equity sales dominates others. Given that the pricing of new issues is very closely tied to some earnings measure 2 , issuers of IPOs who seek to maximize capital raised from IPOs can temporarily deceive investors by opportunistically manipulating earnings through accrual management. Additionally, China's stock markets require successful IPO candidates to have a sound record of financial performance in the past three consecutive years. There is near unanimity in the belief that earnings, as one stated selection criterion for public listing, play a critically important role in the IPO process.
Issuers who do not satisfy this can stretch their earnings measure to qualify while financially qualified issuers may wish to boost their chances of being selected. It seems to pay to manage earnings around IPOs.
Earnings are managed only if opportunities present themselves. Since managers have much discretion when deciding on the size and timing of accruals, they can select appropriate accounting methods and estimates from a variety of acceptable choices. Thus depending on the methods selected and numerous estimates that must be made, reported earnings can vary considerably, and yet still be in compliance with the GAAP.
Earnings Management and Market Performance
Recall that the extent of underpricing is decided not only by the offer price but the closing price on the first few day(s) of trading as well. 
Initial excess return
where P j,0 and P j,1 are the offer price and the closing price of new issue j on the first day of trading. P m,,0 and P m,1 are the market index on the offer date and first trading day, respectively.
Underperformance of IPOs
Given the striking short-run abnormal returns of IPOs, it is interesting to examine whether this underpricing will be corrected in the long term as Barberis et al. (1998) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006) propose. Ritter (1991) is the first to explore this issue and many studies afterwards also find similar evidence that IPOs underperform significantly relative to non-issuing firms for three to five years after listing.
We follow the previous research and consider two measures of long-term stock performance from its offer date until the earliest of its delisting date, its third anniversary, and December 31, 2006: cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold returns. Instead of using calendar months, we define one month as 21 successive trading days except that month 0 only comprises the first day of public trading. Thus the 2-22 nd event days make up month 1, the 23-43 rd event days make up month 2, etc.
We use two benchmarks for adjustment including the general market index 5 , and listed firms matched by industry and size. Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a stock over the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding period. The benchmark-adjusted return for stock j in event month t is given as:
The average benchmark-adjusted on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t is the equally-weighted arithmetic average of the benchmark-adjusted returns:
The cumulative benchmark-adjusted aftermarket performance from event month q to event month s is the summation of the average benchmark-adjusted returns:
As an alternative to the use of cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns, we also consider buy and hold returns with a 3-year holding period:
Earnings Management
Following previous research on earnings management, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management 6 . As adjustments to cash flows, total accruals in a given year are defined as reported earnings or net income in excess of operating cash flows.
Total Accruals
AC ≡ Net Income -Operating Cash Flows
Since issuers may have a preference for discretion over short-and long-term accruals 
We understand that some accrual adjustments are appropriate and necessary given the business conditions typically faced by the firm in the industry. Without information on actual economic events and the timing of inflows and outflows, it is difficult for investors to infer the extent to which accruals are adjusted. In event studies, we use benchmarks to define abnormal returns. Likewise we need benchmarks here further to decompose accruals into two parts, one described by firm and industry conditions and the other presumed to be managed by issuers.
We use the modified Jones (1991) cross-sectional model for this purpose.
"The cross-sectional approach automatically adjusts for the effects of fluctuating industry-wide economic conditions that influence accruals independent of any earnings management in each year." (Teoh et al. 1998b (Teoh et al. , page 1940 Generally, current accruals (CA) are regressed on the change in sales in a cross-sectional regression using non-IPO benchmarks in the same industry j on a yearly basis. Non-IPO firms with at least two years of trading records in the market are used as benchmarks. All variables in the regression are scaled by the firm's total assets (TA) at the beginning of each fiscal year t.
The fitted current accruals of the issuers i in a given year t are calculated using the estimated coefficients from the regression and the change in sales net of the change in accounts receivable. The change in accounts receivable (AR) is subtracted from the change in sales to allow for the possibility of sales manipulation. Fitted current accruals are considered to be the level necessary to support the firm's sales increase and are termed non-discretionary current accruals (NDCA).
The regression residual is presumed not to be dictated by firm and industry conditions but instead to have been managed. It is termed discretionary current accruals (DCA):
To obtain discretionary and non-discretionary long-term accruals, we first estimate discretionary and non-discretionary total accruals. The discretionary total accrual (DAC) for firm i for year t is calculated in a manner similar to the current accrual (CA) except now the total accrual (AC) is used as the dependant variable and the regression includes gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE) as an additional explanatory variable. 
Non-discretionary total accruals (NDA) and discretionary total accruals (DA) calculated as:
Non-discretionary long-term accruals (NDLA) are defined as the difference between non-discretionary total accruals (NDA) and non-discretionary current accruals (NDCA). Discretionary long-term accruals (DLA) are the difference between assetscaled long-term accrual and non-discretionary long-term accruals (NDLA).
We emphasize in this study discretionary current accruals, DCA, as the key variables representing earnings management. Discretional total accruals (DA) are also examined as an alternative to DCA.
To illustrate the calculation of DA and DCA, consider JIELEE INDUSTRY CO., LTD 7 . JIELEE went public in July 2000, operating in the transportation Industry.
There were 24 non-IPO firms as benchmarks in this industry. Repeating the CA and AC computations for these firms, and estimating the Jones model yields the fitted equations (See equation (9) and (12) respectively): (10) and (13) 
Equations (11), (14), (15) and (16) 
Control Variables and Model Specifications
To reduce the possible model misspecification problem due to missing variables, we control for other determinants of IPO underpricing.
Since few established theories show explanatory power in rationalizing severe underpricing of IPOs in China, we mainly focus on existent empirical studies and seek to find relevant determinants of underpricing. Previous studies report underpricing is related to the time lag between offering and listing, among them, Mok and Hui (1998) , Su and Fleisher (1999), and Chan et al. (2004) , to name but a few. The long time elapsed before the realization of initial returns is one of the most salient features of China's stock markets. Issuers of IPOs normally spend months waiting for approval from the CSRC. Due to the value of time, the longer the gap, the more compensation is required and thus the more underpricing observed in the aftermarket. However recent studies, for example Coakley et al. (2006) , further examine this issue and find that this relation is special when including IPOs in early periods. Since both underpricing and the time lag tend to decrease over time due to continued improvement in share issuing and pricing, this may be a sample specific problem.
Prior studies document that underpricing is related to the issuing size or funds raised (Su and Fleisher 1999 , Chan et al. 2004 , Chi and Padgett 2005 . This relation could be explained by valuation uncertainty and information asymmetry (Rock 1986, Ritter and Welch 2002) . When the issuing size becomes larger, it is more difficult to value the firm. Investors should receive more compensation in the form of underpricing. Another determinant in the literature is the rate of allocation in oversubscribed IPOs (Chi and Padgett 2005, Coakley et al. 2007 ). Underpricing of IPOs reported in these two studies is negatively related to the rate of allocation due to adverse selection but this relation may sample specific again.
To test our hypothesis, we first examine whether those variables are determinants of underpricing in the context of our sample and then combine control variable(s) with accrual variables into the following two models. where IR is initial returns, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading; DA is discretionary total accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDA is non-discretionary total accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DCA is discretionary current accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDCA is non-discretionary current accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DLA is discretionary long term accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDLA is non-discretionary long term accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; PROCEEDS is the natural logarithm of the issuing size in monetary units. Companies that operated in the banking industry are excluded from our sample as their financial statements are presented in a different format.
3.
Empirical Results
Sample and Benchmark Selection
We also gather financial information of 4351 non-IPO benchmark firms that match our sample IPOs firms for the same period to identify the discretionary components in accruals. These benchmark firms are required to have at least two years of history in the market. Following convention, we exclude abnormal nonissuing benchmarks with total accruals or current accruals greater than total assets at the beginning of year in absolute terms. [ Table 2 around here] Twenty-one of the 36 monthly adjusted returns are negative, among which 11 fall in the last 12 months. After ups and downs for the first 24 months, the cumulative average abnormal returns become poorer and poorer. By contrast, the decline in unadjusted cumulative returns appears to be more dramatic. Twenty-three are positive in the first 24 months and all but one are negative in the last 12 months, with 23 of them having t-statistics significant mainly at the level of 5% or better. By the end of month 36 excluding the initial returns, the cumulative average returns are -7.08% (t = -3.12) and -12.04% (t = -3.96) with market index adjustment and no adjustment respectively. The underperformance of IPOs is significant in both statistical and economical terms. [ Figure 1 around here] 8 We check the industry specifications of the firms year by year in case firms may change their core business from one industry to another after the IPO.
Descriptive Statistics
Until month 19 in which the cumulative average abnormal returns peak at 0.88%, CARs with market index adjustment are small and move around zero and none is significant. But it is followed thereafter by a steady decline for the remaining months.
The series of CARs with no adjustment follow a similar pattern but it declines more dramatically from a record high of 4.30% in month 16 to a record low of -12.03% in month 36. The underperformance is statistically significant. [ Table 3 around here]
The distribution of non-issuing firms across industries follows the same broad pattern as IPOs. This means more benchmarks in some industries such as manufacturing but fewer in others such as agriculture, construction, and services. [ Table 4 around here]
Inspection of accrual variables in the table reveals that the average discretionary total accruals and the average discretionary current accruals are both positive and significant at the 1% level. For total accruals in a given financial year, while DA is as small as 6.44% of total assets at the beginning of the year, DCA is as large as 14.65%.
These positive coefficients are consistent with issuers managing earnings through income increasing accruals in the literature. [ Table 5 and 120.07%, whereas the corresponding underpricing in the most aggressive quintiles are 137.32% and 138.45%, respectively.
Univariate Analysis
Multiple Regression Results
Our hypothesis predicts that, given a class of irrational investors, the impact of earnings management on the market price is greater than that on the offer price. The intuition is that IPO underpricing is positively related to the discretionary components of accruals. We examine this hypothesis controlling for other determinants of underpricing. [ Table 6 around here]
In Model 0, the determinants of IPO underpricing are examined. Only the coefficients on PROCEEDS are statistically significant for both sample groups. We control for this variable in the two models for testing earnings management.
In the first model with discretionary total accruals (DA) as a proxy for earnings management, we find a significant and positive relation between DA and underpricing. This is consistent with the prediction that irrational investors who fail to understand abnormal accruals pay too much for the inflated earnings. In model 2 we distinguish between the current and long term components of DA and nondiscretionary total accruals (NDA). Here there is a significantly positive relationship between discretionary current accruals (DCA) and underpricing which indicates that issuers of IPOs prefer to manage earnings using short-term accruals. Separating the short-and long-term components of accruals results in an improvement of both the level of significance and the R 2 .
This relation obtains not only in the sample of 506 with the 13 basic industry classifications but also when we use 91 detailed industry specifications. Although the sample size reduces to 337 due to lack of non-IPO benchmarks in some sectors, the relation between proxies for earnings management and underpricing is still positive and becomes even more significant when compared to those with 506 samples. In general, the models with more accurate matching benchmarks and models separating the short and long term components of accruals result in better R 2 . These findings strongly support our analysis that in emerging markets where investor sentiment is prevalent, there is a possibility that earnings management increases the trading prices more than the offer prices systematically.
4.
Robustness Checks
The tests in this subsection focus on three aspects that could potentially affect the positive relation between discretionary components of accruals and underpricing: the choice of benchmarks, the choice of accrual models, and the choice of proxies for earnings management.
The Fama-French Industry Classification
The industry classification used in this study follows the official Chinese industry [ Table 7 around here] [ Table 8 around here]
Jones (1991) Model
We rely on the modified Jones ( Advocates contend that this modification is to accommodate many scenarios of sales manipulation, for example, credit policies are relaxed to achieve high sales prior to the offerings. Table 9 presents regression results of the two models using the original Jones model (1991). The t-values are calculated using White's (1980) robust standard errors.
[ Table 9 around here]
The positive relation between underpricing and the discretionary components remains significant. Our results remain robust to the choice of accrual model.
Operating Income
The total accruals in both the original and modified Jones (1991) models are calculated as the difference between the reported earnings (net income) and cash flow from operations. We note that not all earnings reported in financial statements come from operations and those non-operating profits are not likely to pertain as regularly as the operating ones. For example, debt restructuring and disposal of fixed assets, whether a gain or loss, are either infrequent in occurrence or unusual in nature.
In the empirical literature, some use as a precaution earnings before discontinued operations and extraordinary items, such as Subramanyam (1996) Other things being equal, including the estimating process of discretionary components, the industry classification, and the modified Jones (1991) model, we examine whether the results are robust to alternative definition of total accruals. Table   10 presents regression results when using operating income to calculate total accruals.
[ Table 10 around here]
With regard to the positive relations between the discretionary components and underpricing, the influence caused by replacing net income with operating income is far from substantial. The even better t-values and R 2 in both models indicate that the positive relation is unaffected and robust to alternative accrual specifications.
Conclusions
Previous studies of earnings management and IPOs have shown that the issuers tend to use income-increasing accruals to overstate reported earnings prior to IPOs. The hypothesis developed in this study predicts that sentiment investors without fully adjusting for potential earnings manipulation naively extrapolate the growth trend.
This mistake propels stock prices to unduly high levels in the short run but is gradually corrected over longer horizons. Here, using data on 506 IPOs that went public during the 1998-2003 period and 4351 non-IPO benchmarks, we test the proposition empirically.
We estimate the managed accrual components using the modified Jones (1991) model. We separate non-discretionary from discretionary total accruals and then further decompose them into long and short term parts. We use non-IPO year-industry benchmarks to generate the fitted coefficients in the model to estimate the nondiscretionary components of the sample IPOs. We find evidence of significantly positive discretionary accruals consistent with issuers window-dressing earnings around IPOs using income-increasing accruals. Controlling for other determinants of underpricing, we find that these discretionary accruals predict the cross-sectional underpricing of IPOs.
This result is quite robust to the choice of benchmarks, accrual models, and income variables when estimating accruals. We use the Fama-French 12-industry classification as an alternative to the official classification on 13 industries, and the relation between discretionary components and underpricing remain as significant as it was. We also use the original Jones (1991) model to examine this, and the result is unaffected by the choice of model. We also use operating income in place of net income and this change does not affect the significant and positive relation.
In addition to the short-run study, we investigate the long-run stock performance of IPOs and find that IPO stocks start to underperform two years after listing. For IPOs under study with average initial returns on the first-trading day of some 128.32%, their cumulative average returns over a subsequent three-year period with and with no market index adjustments are -7.08% and -12.04%.
Our findings provide strong evidence that the issuers can overstate earnings prior to IPOs. Since the two components of underpricing are affected by earnings management and they tend to offset one another, the relationship between earnings management and underpricing may not be systematic in a market with little or no investor sentiment. In this respect, the specific characteristics of China's stock markets provide fertile ground for investor sentiment. This propels stock prices to unduly high levels so that earnings management impacts more on trading than on offer prices. As investor sentiment fades in the long run, prices become less and less affected, leading to negative cumulative stock returns. Our study complements the literature on accruals that examines earnings management around IPOs. It also sheds new light on both the underpricing and long term underperformance puzzles in Chinese IPOs. IR is the initial return, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading; PROCEEDS is the natural logarithm of the issuing size in monetary units; DA is discretionary total accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDA is non-discretionary total accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DCA is discretionary current accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDCA is non-discretionary current accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DLA is discretionary long term accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDLA is non-discretionary long term accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks. Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level where IR is the initial return, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading; PROCEEDS is the natural logarithm of the issuing size in monetary units; TIMELAG is the time elapsed between offering and listing; ALLOC is the rate of allocation in an oversubscribed IPO; DA is discretionary total accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDA is non-discretionary total accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DCA is discretionary current accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDCA is non-discretionary current accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DLA is discretionary long term accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDLA is non-discretionary long term accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks. * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level where IR is the initial return, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading; PROCEEDS is the natural logarithm of the issuing size in monetary units; DA is discretionary total accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDA is non-discretionary total accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DCA is discretionary current accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDCA is non-discretionary current accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DLA is discretionary long term accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDLA is non-discretionary long term accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks. * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level where IR is the initial return, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading; PROCEEDS is the natural logarithm of the issuing size in monetary units; DA is discretionary total accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDA is non-discretionary total accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DCA is discretionary current accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDCA is non-discretionary current accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DLA is discretionary long term accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDLA is non-discretionary long term accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks. * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level where IR is the initial return, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading; PROCEEDS is the natural logarithm of the issuing size in monetary units; DA is discretionary total accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDA is non-discretionary total accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DCA is discretionary current accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDCA is non-discretionary current accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks; DLA is discretionary long term accruals scaled by total assets at the beginning of year; NDLA is non-discretionary long term accruals estimated from the fitted coefficients generated from benchmarks. * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level 
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